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THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MARKET EFFECTS AND PURE 
POLITICAL RISK ON THE MAJOR WESTERN OIL AND GAS STOCK 





A key question in European integration is whether or not the global oil and gas market 
sector (over the period which includes the oil price hikes of 2001 to late 2007 and the 
global financial crisis from mid 2008 to early 2009) has been impacted to a greater or 
lesser extent by major Western country oil and gas stock market sectors (such as, 
those in the USA, the EMU and the UK) as well as political, social and legal factors 
(embodied in political risk ratings) for the USA, the UK and the key economies of the 
EMU (that is, France, Germany and Italy). This short study uses analysis of both 
unlagged and lagged data in multivariate models to test these relationships and finds a 
closer relationship politically and financially between the USA and the UK than 
between the EMU and the UK markets. The EMU and the major EMU countries 
considered separately in oil and gas market sector movements and political risk 
ratings movements have very little financial and political influence on the movement 

















According to theory and the Law of One Price as revisited by Asche et al, (2000), in 
an integrated market, prices on homogenous goods from different producers and 
suppliers should move together. Price differentials should only indicate differences in 
transportation costs and quality. These price differentials for energy should flow 
through to oil and gas stock markets sectors and be reflected in oil and gas share 
returns. They should also be reflective of the degree of oil and gas stock market 
integration of the major Western stock markets. 
 
There is a connection between market integration and political risk in energy markets. 
There is also a relationship between energy prices, political risk and prices in energy 
stock market sectors. For example, Asche et al (2000) find that cointegration tests 
showed different border prices for gas to Germany moved proportionally over time. 
This indicated integration of the German gas market. They also studied whether or not 
there were large price differences between gas from Norwegian, Dutch and Russian 
exporters. They find differences in mean prices (Russian gas was cheaper) and the 
reasons for the price differences were ascribed to differences in volume flexibility and 
perceived political risk.  The question in the case of EMU countries is whether or not 
energy market integration in the leading EMU countries energy sectors and political 
risk changes in EMU countries have flowed over to global oil and gas stock market 
sector integration. 
 
It is logical that oil and gas listed companies need to be combined as a market sector. 
There is a proven strong connection between oil prices and gas prices and this 
translates to a need to include energy companies in one sectorial stock price index. 
Most researchers agree that the price of oil has something to do with the price of gas 
(For example, Okugu, 2002; Mazighi, 2005 and Eng, 2006). Some also agree that 
other energy prices, such as coal are related to oil and gas prices (For example, 
Bachmeier, 2006; Pindyck, 1999). If this is the case in North America as well as in 
Continental Europe, then an interim global gas pricing model remains possible, with 
oil and coal prices partial forecasters of gas prices. This direction of energy markets 
should also be indicated in the degree of integration of American and European oil 
and gas stock market sectors.  
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The issues are in respect to the integration of global oil and gas stock market sectors 
1. Are the factors driving the major Western oil and gas stock market sectors over the 
period of study mainly political or economic and financial (that is, stock market 
related) in nature? 2. Is the EMU oil and gas market a greater political and legal force 
impacting the main global oil and gas markets over the period of study compared to 
the UK? 3. Is the UK oil and gas stock market sector more economically and 
politically integrated with the US and global markets than it is with the EMU? In 
respect to the last issue it needs to be remembered that whilst the UK is a member of 
the European Union it has not fully committed to membership of the EMU. 
 
A definition of political risk is required for this study Political risk is the willingness 
of countries to service their external commitments (For example, Bourke & 
Shanmugam, 1990; Cantor & Packer, 1996). This is influenced by human, cultural, 
social and legal factors that provide a subjective quantification of influences such as, 
the degree of corruption, the history of law and order and the quality of the 
bureaucracy (ICRG, 2009). It is suggested that political risk ratings in Western 
economies have become more volatile over the period since “9/11” terrorist attacks, 
the Iraqi war, the corporate governance issues in the USA related to for example, 
Worldcom and Enron, and more recently the finance and banking governance issues 
that led to the global financial crisis in the USA, the UK and the major Western 
European countries (For an indication of the volatility in political risk ratings over the 
full period of the study, see Appendix 2). 
 
Political risk ratings are used by financial economists as a management tool for 
assessing economic, financial and political riskiness in doing business with different 
countries either at a macro or a microeconomic level (For example they assist banks 
lending international to ascribe credit risk premia to arrive at a market interest rate). 
Political risk ratings are part of country or sovereign risk ratings, with the other two 
components of economic risk and financial risk remaining a measure of a country’s 
ability to meet external obligations. 
 
Country stock market indices, sectorial or otherwise, have proven to be reliable 
indicators of economic and financial conditions. Major Western stock markets sectors 
in oil and gas have also be quite volatile over the period from 2001 to 2008 for similar 
reasons relating to oil prices, US corporate governance issues and the global financial 
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crisis.  Oil and gas market data also reflect global economic and financial conditions 
and may also be impacted by political risk factors due to the importance of oil and gas 
as an essential commodity and because the OPEC cartel is comprised of developing 




Global and country oil and gas market monthly indexed data are collected from the 
DataStream database covering the period June 2001 to December 2008 for the world, 
the USA the UK and the EMU. Over a similar period monthly political risk ratings are 
gathered from the ICRG (2009) for the UK, The USA and the major EMU countries 
in France, Germany and Italy.  
 
The world oil and gas stock market price index values are reported by Datastream 
who base their series on stock exchange oil and gas price indices that commonly use a 
representative sample of publicly listed oil and gas related companies in each country, 
with the stock prices reflected in the index converted into US Dollars at current 
exchange rates. The companies included in the index generally represent around 85% 
of the volumes traded in the country oil and gas markets. The index is regularly re-
assessed (at least every quarter) to identify changes in the trading volumes of each 
represented company share. Then a new portfolio is compiled, with new weightings 
based on the changes in trading activity in each share.  
 
The companies represented in the index commonly represent around 70% of the total 
oil and gas stock market capitalisation of listed companies in each market. The indices 
generally reflect information that has been updated daily for the morning following 
the reference day and may be regarded as an important global economic indicator, 




Changes in price indices and political risk ratings are studied in a single period (lags 

















sPOG '∆  Represent the changes in oil and gas price index values for the world (the 
dependent variable), the UK, the USA and the EMU indices respectively. 
 
'SR∆ s represent the changes in political risk ratings for the USA, the UK, France,  
Germany and Italy respectively. 
 
tEMUOG
α is the regression intercept for the world oil and gas regression at time t. 
 
β ’s represent the regression coefficients for each of the above independent variables. 
 
It is also useful, in respect to issue number 3 to provide a basic study on UK political 
risk relationships with the USA and the key EMU countries. Another single period 








An indication of the volatility in level series oil and gas stock market sectors for the 
world, the USA, the UK, and the EMU is provided in Appendix 1. The study moves 
to first differences to remove serial correlation problems in the regression errors. The 
findings of this study of Equation 1) in first differences (price changes and political 
risk ratings changes) are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Regression results for the world oil and gas market index changes 
Regression statistics Value 
Adjusted R Square 0.9187 
Durbin Watson test statistic 2.2092 
t-statistic UK oil and gas market index changes 13.9038 
t-statistic US oil and gas market index changes 19.8146 
t-statistic political risk changes UK -2.4572* 
 
Note: Variable are significant at the 1% level except for *, which is significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
The results show that there is not a problem with serial correlation in this regression 
as the Durbin Watson (DW) test statistic is significantly greater than 2. The results of 
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the model may be relied upon. The explanatory power of the model is strong with an 
adjusted R Square value of 0.9187 (91.87%). The t-statistics show that the EMU oil 
and gas market does not possess a significant relationship with global oil and gas 
markets, but the US market and then the UK market are significant parts of the 
explanatory power of the model (t statistics at 19.8146 and 13.9038, which are 
significant at the 1% level).  
 
The t-statistics also indicate that political risk changes in the UK are an explanatory 
variable in this model (where the t-statistic at -2.4572 is significant at the 5% level), 
but its contribution to the explanatory power is substantially less than the changes in 
the oil and gas market indices in the UK and the USA. Changes in political risk 
ratings in Germany, France and Italy are not significant explanatory variables.  
 
Logically there is a positive relationship between the UK and the USA oil and gas 
price changes and those of the world oil and gas market. As returns increase in one 
market so they do in the other. There is a negative relationship between changes in 
political risk in the UK and the changes in the world oil and gas market index. That is, 
as political risk ratings decrease in the UK (that is, as political risk reduces) the world 
oil and gas prices and returns increase. This is not in accordance with the risk/return 
relationships in financial economics theory but it may indicate risk aversion on the 
part of the UK political environment when oil and gas markets are considered. It may 
be that when prices in the volatile oil and gas sector increase, the UK risk analysts 
perceive an improving domestic political environment. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of a system that incorporates the interaction of political risk 
changes in the UK with political risk changes in the major EMU countries (France, 
Germany and Italy) and the USA. 
Table2 
Regression results for UK political risk ratings changes 
Statistic Value 
Adjusted R Square 0.0923 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.9684 
t-statistic USA political risk changes 3.8126 
Standard error of regression 0.7788 
 




These results indicate a model that is clearly not fully specified, but nevertheless has 
an explanatory power of around 9.23% (adjusted R Square value is 0.0923, which is 
significant at the 1% level). This number may be relied upon as DW test statistic is 
significantly greater than 1.5 and serial correlation in the regression errors is not a 
problem. Around 9% of the variance of the changes in the UK political risk is 
explained predominantly by the changes in political risk in the USA (the t-statistic for 
USA political risk changes at 3.8126 is significant at the 1% level). France, Germany 
and Italy political risk changes are not significant explanatory variables in the system 
studied at any level of significance. The positive relationship between the changes in 
USA political risk ratings and those of the UK indicates that as political risk in the 
USA increases, political risk in the UK also increases. 
 
Equation 1) is respecified into a VAR with all variables in that equation optimally 
lagged. On a VAR Stability Condition test it the findings are that the VAR satisfies 
the test with no root lying outside the unit circle. The VAR lag order selection criteria 
indicates, through the Likelihood Ratio and Schwartz Criteria, that the optimal lag is 
1-2 months. The VAR in the specified form with the world oil and gas market treated 
endogenously has strong explanatory power with an adjusted R Square value of 
0.8720 significant at the 1% level. VAR based Granger causality test Chi Square 
statistic over a 2 month lag verify that there is no significant evidence at the 10% level 
of one-way causality running from the independent variables to the world oil and gas 
market.  
 
There is evidence at the 1% level that all variables in the model are influencing the 
UK oil and gas sector (when the UK is treated endogenously) and at the 10% level all 
variables are influencing the US oil and gas market (when the US oil and gas market 
is treated endogenously). When the EMU oil and gas market is treated endogenously 
there is also Granger causality running from the other variables at the 10% level of 
significance. When each country political risk variable is treated endogenously all of 
the other variables in each case are shown to influence that variable at levels of 
significance ranging from 1% to 10%. 
 
Pair-wise Granger causality tests on two month lags were also run on changes in the 
oil and gas market indices and changes in the political risk ratings.  Significance 
levels of F statistics up to the 10% level were observed. Granger causality runs from 
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the world oil and gas market changes to the UK market changes (at 1%), from the US 
market to the UK market (at 1%). There is dual causality between political risk 
changes in the UK and changes in the US oil and gas market. The changes in political 
risk from the UK having slightly greater statistical significance (at 5% compared to 
10%). Moreover, changes in the oil and gas markets in the USA Granger cause 
changes in political risk in Germany (at the 5% level); Changes in political risk in the 
UK Granger cause changes in the EMU oil and gas market (at the 10% level). 
Changes in political risk in the UK Granger cause changes in political risk in France 
(at the 10% level).  
 
There is dual Granger causality at the 10% level between changes in political risk in 
the UK and changes in political risk in Germany (the relationship is stronger running 
from Germany to the UK). Changes in the world oil and gas market Granger cause 
changes in political risk in Germany (at the 5% level). It is however significant at the 
10% level that changes in the EMU oil and gas market Granger cause changes in the 
UK oil and gas market. Overall the results again demonstrate that the relationships 
between country oil and gas market changes and political risk ratings changes are 
stronger between the world oil and gas markets and the USA and UK markets and 




It is concluded from this short analysis that, in unlagged data, the oil markets of the 
US and the UK, in that order, have a stronger relationship with each other and with 
the global oil and gas market than with the EMU. To a lesser extent political risk 
changes in the UK have a small, but significant relationship with the global oil and 
gas market. The model that includes these variables has strong explanatory power. 
The political influence of the major EMU countries (That is, France, Germany and 
Italy) on the global oil and gas market is not statistically significant.  
 
When a VAR is introduced with optimally lagged data the strength of the explanatory 
power of the model is confirmed. When both pair-wise Granger causality and VAR 
based causality tests are applied it is confirmed that the stronger relationships are 
between the world oil and gas market and those in the USA and the UK. The causality 
tests also indicate stronger causal relationships between the USA and the UK in both 
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oil and gas markets and in political risk ratings. The major relationships in political 
risk in unlagged data, when political risk ratings only are considered, are between the 
US and the UK.  
 
All of this provides evidence that during a period of volatility over the past 7 years in 
both oil and gas markets and in political environment, the USA and the UK oil and 
gas markets are closer to the world market than the EMU. In addition the UK has 
been closer to the USA than it has been to the major EMU economies, and might 
indicate that, from the view point of energy stock markets sectors, that the UK is 
understandably not yet fully committed either politically or economically to take the 
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Where OGW, OGUS, OGUK, OIGEMU are the price indices for the oil and gas 



















Note: PRUK, PRUSA, PRFRAN, PRGERM, PRITAL are the political risk 
ratings for the UK, USA, France, Germany and Italy. The variable was not a 
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